A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
AbstractThis note demonstrates that a lattice game with strategic substitutes is dominancesolvable if and only if there exists a unique fixed point of the function that results from an iteration of the best response function. This finding complements a result of Milgrom and RobertsÃ¢â¬â¢ (1990) by which a lattice game with strategic complements is dominance-solvable if and only if there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We illustrate our main result by an application to a model of Cournot outcomecompetition.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Alexander Zimper, 2005. "A fixed point characterization of the dominancesolvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes," Working Papers 32, Economic Research Southern Africa.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
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