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Repeated Downsian electoral competition

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Author Info
John Duggan ()
Mark Fey ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 35 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 39-69
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:39-69

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Related research
Keywords: Elections; Repeated game; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Folk theorem; Median voter theorem;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2383-2422, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John Duggan, . "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Wallis Working Papers WP9, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    Other versions:
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition," Wallis Working Papers WP41, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Wallis Working Papers WP53, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hatfield, John, 2006. "Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth," Research Papers 1929, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  4. Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-021, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2006. "Political reputations and campaign promises," Working Papers 1258, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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