Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Repeated Downsian electoral competition

Contents:

Author Info

  • John Duggan

    ()

  • Mark Fey

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 35 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 39-69

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:39-69

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Elections; Repeated game; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Folk theorem; Median voter theorem;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October.
  2. John Duggan, . "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Wallis Working Papers WP9, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  4. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2383-2422, December.
  5. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. B. Douglas Bernheim & Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2007. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Discussion Papers 07-029, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Vincent Anesi, 2010. "A New Old Solution for Weak Tournaments," Discussion Papers 2010-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  3. John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Wallis Working Papers WP53, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  4. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2010. "Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies," Working Papers 1011, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2010.
  5. Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections," Working Papers 236, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  6. Jon X. Eguia & Kenneth A. Shepsle, 2014. "Endogenous Assembly Rules, Senior Agenda Power, and Incumbency Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 14/638, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  7. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2008. "A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition," Wallis Working Papers WP57, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  8. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  9. Hatfield, John, 2006. "Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth," Research Papers 1929, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  10. John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers WP63, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  11. Hans Grüner, 2009. "Inequality and Political Consensus," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 239-265, September.
  12. Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin, 2008. "Politically credible social insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 129-151, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:39-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.