Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice
AbstractWe introduce a new class of rules for resolving quasilinear social choice problems. These rules extend those of Green . We call such rules multi-utilitarian rules. Each multi-utilitarian rule is associated with a probability measure over the set of weighted utilitarian rules, and is derived as the expectation of this probability. These rules are characterized by the axioms efficiency, translation invariance, monotonicity, continuity, and additivity. By adding recursive invariance, we obtain a class of asymmetric rules generalizing those Green characterizes. A multi-utilitarian rule satisfying strong monotonicity has an associated probability measure with full support.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 33 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Chambers, Christopher P., 2003. "Multi-Utilitarianism in Two-Agent Quasilinear Social Choice," Working Papers 1177, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Geoffroy de Clippel & Camelia Bejan, 2009.
"No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems,"
2009-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Bejan, Camelia, 2011. "No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1995-2012, September.
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