Declining valuations in sequential auctions

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Declining valuations in sequential auctions

Author Info

Thomas Kittsteiner ()
Jörg Nikutta
Eyal Winter

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Games Theory.

Volume (Year): 33 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 89-106
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:89-106

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Thomas Kittsteiner & Jorg Nikutta & Eyal Winter, 2004. "Declining Valuations in Sequential Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp385, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "Labour market screening with intermediaries," Discussion Papers 138, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Paul Schweinzer, 2008. "Labour market recruiting with intermediaries," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 119-127, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.