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Borel stay-in-a-set games

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  • A. Maitra
  • W. Sudderth

Abstract

Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n , and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n ) of the players. If the payoff to each player i is 1 or 0 according to whether or not the stochastic process of states stays forever in a given Borel set G i , then there is an ε-equilibrium for every ε>0. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

Suggested Citation

  • A. Maitra & W. Sudderth, 2003. "Borel stay-in-a-set games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 97-108, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2003:i:1:p:97-108
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820300148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. MERTENS , Jean-François & SORIN , Sylvain & ZAMIR , Shmuel, 1994. "Repeated Games. Part A : Background Material," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Andrzej Nowak, 2003. "On a new class of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibrium points," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 121-132, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Ashok P. Maitra & William D. Sudderth, 2007. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(3), pages 711-722, August.
    3. R. Laraki & A. Maitra & W. Sudderth, 2013. "Two-Person Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Semicontinuous Payoff," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 162-171, June.
    4. Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.

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