Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A 1,A 2,…,A n , and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a 1,a 2,…,a n ) of the players. If the payoff to each player i is 1 or 0 according to whether or not the stochastic process of states stays forever in a given Borel set G i , then there is an ε-equilibrium for every ε>0. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 32 (2003) Issue (Month): 1 (December) Pages: 97-108 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF