Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations
AbstractThis paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We consider the weighted adaptation of the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989). The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. Each weighted constrained egalitarian solution is determined (in polynomial time) as a home-down allocation, which creates further insight in the local behaviour of the weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The constrained egalitarian solution is characterized in terms of a cost sharing mechanism.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Koster, M.A.L. & Molina, E. & Sprumont, Y. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "Sharing the cost of a network: Core and core allocations," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91407, Tilburg University.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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