Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations

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Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations

Author Info

S. H. Tijs () (CentER and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands Final version November 2001)
M. Koster () (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
E. Molina () (Centro de Investigación Operativa, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, Elche, Spain)
Y. Sprumont () (C.R.D.E. et Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Maurice Koster

Abstract

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We consider the weighted adaptation of the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989). The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. Each weighted constrained egalitarian solution is determined (in polynomial time) as a home-down allocation, which creates further insight in the local behaviour of the weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The constrained egalitarian solution is characterized in terms of a cost sharing mechanism.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 567-599
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:567-599

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Paper
- Koster, M. & Molina, E. & Sprumont, Y. & Tijs, S., 1998. "Sharing the cost of a network : core and core allocations," Discussion Paper 21, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S, 1992. "Weighted Values and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 27-39.
Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1981. "Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 283-286, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Aadland, David & Kolpin, Van, 1998. "Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 203-218, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "On Weighted Shapley Values," Discussion Papers 602, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Tijs, S.H. & Branzei, R., 2004. "Cases in cooperation and cutting the cake," Discussion Paper 108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers & Ruud Hendrickx, 2001. "Operations research games: A survey," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 139-199, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Borm, P. & Hamers, H. & Hendrickx,, 2001. "Operations research games : a survey," Discussion Paper 45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Miquel, S. & Velzen, S. van & Hamers, H. & Norde, H., 2003. "Fixed tree games with repeated players," Discussion Paper 87, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Koster, M., 1999. "Weighted constrained egalitarianism in tu-games," Discussion Paper 107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Bjorndal, E. & Koster, M. & Tijs, S., 1999. "Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

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