Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations


Author Info

  • S. H. Tijs

    (CentER and Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands Final version November 2001)

  • M. Koster

    (Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands)

  • E. Molina

    (Centro de Investigación Operativa, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, Elche, Spain)

  • Y. Sprumont

    (C.R.D.E. et Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada)


This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We consider the weighted adaptation of the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989). The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. Each weighted constrained egalitarian solution is determined (in polynomial time) as a home-down allocation, which creates further insight in the local behaviour of the weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The constrained egalitarian solution is characterized in terms of a cost sharing mechanism.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 567-599

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:567-599

Contact details of provider:
Web page:

Order Information:

Related research

Keywords: Cooperative game theory · cost sharing · tree games · core · constrained egalitarianism.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:


No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2013. "Additive cost sharing on a tree," Working Papers 1307, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
  2. Koster, M.A.L., 1999. "Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games," Discussion Paper 1999-107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Márkus, Judit & Pintér, Miklós & Radványi, Anna, 2011. "The Shapley value for airport and irrigation games," MPRA Paper 30031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Bjorndal, E. & Koster, M.A.L. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-142601, Tilburg University.
  5. Moulin, Herve & Laigret, Francois, 2011. "Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 314-320, May.
  6. Koster, Maurice, 2002. "Hierarchical constrained egalitarianism in TU-games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 251-265, March.
  7. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2004. "Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake," Discussion Paper 2004-108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Bergantiños, G. & Gómez-Rúa, M. & Llorca, N. & Pulido, M. & Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2014. "A new rule for source connection problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 780-788.
  9. Miquel, S. & Velzen, S. van & Hamers, H.J.M. & Norde, H.W., 2003. "Fixed Tree Games with Repeated Players," Discussion Paper 2003-87, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:567-599. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.