Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

On bargaining partner selection when communication is restricted


Author Info

  • Antoni Calvó-Armengol

    (Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III, C/Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe , Spain and CERAS-ENPC, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris, France)


This paper analyzes the optimal selection of a bargaining partner when communication among players is restricted by an exogenously given graph. If players are equally patient, bargaining agreements are immune to players' locations, and the selection of a bargaining partner is not an issue. In contrast, when players differ in their discount factors, both location and impatience matter for bilateral agreements and partner selection becomes an issue. We show that selecting the most impatient neighbor is an equilibrium strategy whenever two players having a common neighbor share their most impatient neighbor. This condition is always satisfied by stratified graphs with no more than three strata. In the absence of this condition, cyclically-stratified graphs with no more than three strata also admit this equilibrium selection rule.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 503-515

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:503-515

Note: Received: November 2000/Final version: January 2002
Contact details of provider:
Web page:

Order Information:

Related research

Keywords: Noncooperative bargaining · bargaining partner · communication network · time preferences.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:


No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Matteo M. Galizzi, 2009. "Bargaining and Networks in a Gas Bilateral Oligopoly," Working Papers, University of Brescia, Department of Economics 0906, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
  2. Xavier Martinez-Giralt & Pedro Pita Barros, 2000. "Selecting Negotiation Processes with Health Care," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 467.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:503-515. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.