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On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities

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  • Carsten Helm

Abstract

This paper analyzes a game in coalitional form that is derived from a simple economy with multilateral externalities. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we assume that agents react to a blocking coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. A non-empty core of this game is established by showing that the game is balanced. The proof relies only on standard convexity assumptions and, therefore, substantially generalizes the results in Chander and Tulkens (1997).

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 141-146

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:141-146

Note: Received June 2000/Revised version March 2001
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Related research

Keywords: coalitional games;

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Cited by:
  1. CHANDER, Parkash, 2003. "The [gamma]-core and coalition formation," CORE Discussion Papers 2003046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Thoron, Sylvie, 2004. "Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 111-134, January.
  3. Flåm, Sjur Didrik, 2002. "Balanced Environmental Games," Working Papers in Economics 17/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  4. Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdaït, 2003. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2003.09, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Thijssen, J.J.J. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Borm, P.E.M., 2002. "Spillovers and Strategic Cooperative Behaviour," Discussion Paper 2002-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Aymeric Lardon, 2012. "The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 387-411, March.
  7. Emilio Calvo & Santiago J. Rubio, 2012. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0112, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
  8. Beard, Rodney & Mallawaarachchi, Thilak, 2011. "Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post?," MPRA Paper 34303, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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