Emilio Calvo () (Dpto. Análisis Económico, Universidad de Valencia, Campus dels Tarongers, Avinguda dels Tarongers, s/n. Edificio Departamental Oriental, 46022 Valencia, Spain) Iñaki Garci´a () (Dpto. Análisis Económico, Universidad de Valencia, Campus dels Tarongers, Avinguda dels Tarongers, s/n. Edificio Departamental Oriental, 46022 Valencia, Spain) José M. Zarzuelo () (Dpto. Economi´a Aplicada IV, Universidad del Pai´s Vasco, Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain)
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Two concepts of replication (conflictual and non-conflictual) are extended from the class of pure bargaining games to the class of NTU games. The behavior of the Harsanyi, Shapley NTU, Egalitarian and Maschler-Owen solutions of the replica games is compared with that of the Nash and Egalitarian solutions in pure bargaining games.
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