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Value theory without symmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Ori Haimanko

    (Yale University, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, P.O. Box 20-8281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281, USA)

Abstract

We investigate quasi-values of finite games - solution concepts that satisfy the axioms of Shapley (1953) with the possible exception of symmetry. Following Owen (1972), we define "random arrival'', or path, values: players are assumed to "enter'' the game randomly, according to independently distributed arrival times, between 0 and 1; the payoff of a player is his expected marginal contribution to the set of players that have arrived before him. The main result of the paper characterizes quasi-values, symmetric with respect to some coalition structure with infinite elements (types), as random path values, with identically distributed random arrival times for all players of the same type. General quasi-values are shown to be the random order values (as in Weber (1988) for a finite universe of players). Pseudo-values (non-symmetric generalization of semivalues) are also characterized, under different assumptions of symmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Ori Haimanko, 2000. "Value theory without symmetry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 451-468.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:451-468
    Note: Received: April 1998/Revised version: February 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hervé Moulin & Yves Sprumont, 2007. "Fair allocation of production externalities : recent results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(1), pages 7-36.
    2. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2006. "Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 152-188, April.
    3. Omer Edhan, 2012. "Representations Of Positive Projections On Lipschitz Vector," Discussion Paper Series dp624, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Friedman, Eric J., 2012. "Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 139-151.
    5. Francesco Passarelli, 2007. "Asymmetric Bargaining," ISLA Working Papers 26, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jan 2007.

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