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The survival value of assuming others to be rational

Author

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  • Johan Stennek

    (The Research Institute for Industrial Economics and CEPR, Box 5501, S-114 85 Stockholm, Sweden)

Abstract

I study the evolution of rationality, using an indirect evolutionary approach, in which nature selects a decision-making procedure, and the procedure chooses actions in matching-games. The main result is that in order for (knowledge of) rationality to survive, it is necessary and sufficient that the rational procedure respects the attraction principle. That is, when a rational agent eliminates a strictly dominated action A, he should only increase the choice probability of the actions actually dominating A and not change the choice probability of other undominated actions. The attraction principle sharpens gametheoretic predictions. Attraction effects have been verified in psychological experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Johan Stennek, 2000. "The survival value of assuming others to be rational," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(2), pages 147-163.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:147-163
    Note: Received: November 1997/Final version: January 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.
    2. Nax, Heinrich Harald & Newton, Jonathan, 2022. "Deep and shallow thinking in the long run," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    3. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Three steps ahead," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    4. Mohlin, Erik, 2012. "Evolution of theories of mind," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 299-318.

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