Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence
AbstractThis paper reports results of an experiment design ed to investigate the nature of cooperation and punishment. Subjects are matched in a series of two-person, two-stage games with a sequential equilibrium that supports first-stage cooperation with a credible threat of subsequent punishment. Participants sometimes used a consistent punish/reward strategy, and when they did, cooperation rates increased dramatically. The results thus contradict "payoff relevance": second-stage behavior can be influenced by first-stage outcomes that have no effect on the payoff structure. Nevertheless, high cooperation rates were often not observed, even with a Pareto undominated "punishment" equilibrium in the second stage.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: received helpful suggestions from Ronald Harstad, Robert Reilly, Roger Sherman, Barry Sopher, from seminar participants at the Universities of Arizona, Pittsburgh and Iowa, and from an anonymous referee. This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (SBR 93-19842 and SBR 93-20044). The data and experiment instructions are available at FTP address fido.econlab.arizona.edu.--> Douglas D. Davis (1), Charles A. Holt (2) Received: November 1993/final version: July 1995
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2011.
"Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games,"
Working Paper Series
883, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2012. "Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 207-219.
- Gagen, Michael, 2013. "Isomorphic Strategy Spaces in Game Theory," MPRA Paper 46176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2007. "More Communication, Less Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games," Working Papers 2007:4, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 24 Nov 2010.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.