Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Douglas D. Davis

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Virginia Commonwealth University, 1015 Floyd Ave., P.O. Box 84-4000, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA)

  • Charles A. Holt

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903, USA)

Abstract

This paper reports results of an experiment design ed to investigate the nature of cooperation and punishment. Subjects are matched in a series of two-person, two-stage games with a sequential equilibrium that supports first-stage cooperation with a credible threat of subsequent punishment. Participants sometimes used a consistent punish/reward strategy, and when they did, cooperation rates increased dramatically. The results thus contradict "payoff relevance": second-stage behavior can be influenced by first-stage outcomes that have no effect on the payoff structure. Nevertheless, high cooperation rates were often not observed, even with a Pareto undominated "punishment" equilibrium in the second stage.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/9028001/90280089.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 89-109

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:89-109

Note: received helpful suggestions from Ronald Harstad, Robert Reilly, Roger Sherman, Barry Sopher, from seminar participants at the Universities of Arizona, Pittsburgh and Iowa, and from an anonymous referee. This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (SBR 93-19842 and SBR 93-20044). The data and experiment instructions are available at FTP address fido.econlab.arizona.edu.--> Douglas D. Davis (1), Charles A. Holt (2) Received: November 1993/final version: July 1995
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Experimental economics · renegotiation proof equilibria;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2007. "More Communication, Less Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games," Working Papers 2007:4, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 24 Nov 2010.
  2. Gagen, Michael, 2013. "Isomorphic Strategy Spaces in Game Theory," MPRA Paper 46176, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2011. "Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games," Working Paper Series 883, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:89-109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.