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Note Core and monotonic allocation methods

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  • David Housman

    ()
    (Department of Mathematics, Goshen College, 1700 South Main Street, Goshen, Indiana 46526, USA)

  • (*), Lori Clark

    ()
    (Marketing Planning & Systems, Chadwick's at Boston, 35 United Drive, West Bridgewater, MA 02379, USA)

Abstract

Young showed in a paper of 1985 (Int. J. Game Theory 14, 65-72) that no core allocation method can be coalitionally monotonic on cooperative games with five or more players. This note extends Young's result. No core allocation method can be coalitionally monotonic on cooperative games with four or more players, and there is an infinite class of core allocation methods that are coalitionally monotonic on three-player cooperative games. Journal of Economic Literature

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 611-616

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:4:p:611-616

Note: Received October 1996/Revised version June 1998
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Related research

Keywords: Value · cooperative game · allocation · axiomatic;

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Cited by:
  1. Biswas, Amit K. & Parthasarathy, T. & Ravindran, G., 2001. "Stability and Largeness of the Core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 227-237, February.
  2. J. Arin, 2013. "Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 325-337, May.
  3. Julio González-Díaz & Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez, 2007. "A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 27-46, September.
  4. Summerfield, Nichalin S. & Dror, Moshe, 2012. "Stochastic programming for decentralized newsvendor with transshipment," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 292-303.
  5. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar & Carlos Rafels Pallarola, 2002. "Coalitionally Monotonic Set-solutions for Cooperative TU Games," Working Papers in Economics 75, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  6. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2010. "Monotonicity of social welfare optima," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 392-402, November.
  7. Calleja, Pedro & Rafels, Carles & Tijs, Stef, 2009. "The aggregate-monotonic core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 742-748, July.
  8. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2010. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," Working Papers in Economics 237, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  9. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2012. "Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 899-913, November.
  10. Özen, Ulaş & Erkip, Nesim & Slikker, Marco, 2012. "Stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 218(2), pages 416-425.
  11. Hans Keiding, 2011. "Maximizing selections from the core of a cooperative game," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 107-118, May.
  12. Pedro Calleja & Carles Rafels & Stef Tijs, 2006. "The Aggregate-Monotonic Core," Working Papers 280, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

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