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Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games

Author

Listed:
  • (*), J. Sánchez-Soriano

    (Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Sciences, University of Alicante, San Vicente del Raspeig, 03071 Alicante, Spain)

  • Stef Tijs

    (Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands)

  • Ana Meca-Martínez

    (Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Sciences, University of Alicante, San Vicente del Raspeig, 03071 Alicante, Spain)

  • I. García-Jurando

    (Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15706, Santiago de Compostela, Spain)

Abstract

This paper deals with a specific aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game. First, we define a very simple normal form game which models the process of coalition formation. To define the payoff functions of the players we use an allocation rule for TU-games. The main objective of this paper is ascertain what conditions of the allocation rule lead to the grand coalition being a strong equilibrium of the normal form game, when the original TU-game is convex.

Suggested Citation

  • (*), J. Sánchez-Soriano & Stef Tijs & Ana Meca-Martínez & I. García-Jurando, 1998. "Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 211-217.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:211-217
    Note: Received January 1996/Revised version December 1996/Final version May 1997
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    Cited by:

    1. Shawei He, 2019. "Coalition Analysis in Basic Hierarchical Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Application to Climate Change Governance Disputes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(5), pages 879-906, October.
    2. Guajardo, Mario & Rönnqvist, Mikael, 2015. "Operations research models for coalition structure in collaborative logistics," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(1), pages 147-159.
    3. Slikker, Marco, 2001. "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 436-448, November.
    4. Slikker, M., 1999. "Coalition Formation and Potential Games," Other publications TiSEM 5d4b7f7b-20a0-440f-a4c2-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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