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On consistent solutions for strategic games

Author

Listed:
  • Graziano Pieri

    (Institute of Scientific and Technical Disciplines, Faculty of Architecture, University of Genoa, Stradone S. Agostino 37, I-16123 Genoa, Italy)

  • Fioravante Patrone

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Genoa, Via Dodecaneso 35, I-16146 Genoa, Italy)

  • Anna Torre

    (Department of Mathematics, University of Pavia, Via Abbiategrasso 209, I-27100 Pavia, Italy)

  • Stef Tijs

    (Department of Econometrics, University of Tilburg, Postbus 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands)

Abstract

Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. There are other solutions, like the -Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characterized using an appropriate substitute of one-person rationality. More generally, we introduce the class of "personalized" Nash equilibria and we prove that it contains all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency.

Suggested Citation

  • Graziano Pieri & Fioravante Patrone & Anna Torre & Stef Tijs, 1998. "On consistent solutions for strategic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 191-200.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:191-200
    Note: Received January 1996/Final version December 1996
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. E. Miglierina & E. Molho & F. Patrone & S. Tijs, 2008. "Axiomatic approach to approximate solutions in multiobjective optimization," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 31(2), pages 95-115, November.
    2. Miglierina Enrico & Molho Elena & Patrone Fioravante & Steff H. Tijs, 2005. "An axiomatic approach to approximate solutions in vector optimization," Economics and Quantitative Methods qf0507, Department of Economics, University of Insubria.

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