Extension of the Perles-Maschler Solution to N-Person Bargaining Games
AbstractThe superadditive solution for 2-person Nash bargaining games was axiomatically defined in Perles/Maschler (1981). In Perles (1982) it was shown that the axioms are incompatible even for 3-person bargaining games. In this paper we offer a generalization method of this solution concept for n-person games. In this method, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) is revealed as the rule followed to determine the movements along the path of intermediate agreements.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 23 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2004:i:35:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ervig,U. & Haake,C., 2003. "Trading bargaining weights," Working Papers 350, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Joachim Rosenmüller, 2007. "A value for Cephoidal NTU games," Working Papers 388, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
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