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Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings

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Author Info
Cheng-Zhong Qin () (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA)
Burkhard Hehenkamp () (Department of Economics, University of Dortmund, D-44221 Dortmund, Germany)
Charles Stuart () (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA)

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Abstract

We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 211-224
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:9:y:1999:i:2:p:211-224

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Related research
Keywords: Oligopoly ; Bertrand equilibrium ; Cournot equilibrium ; Natural selection ; Evolutionary games;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

Cited by:
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  1. Massimo A. De Francesco, 2001. "On stability of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a simple model of the labour market," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3, pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.

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