Diversity and the disinterest in trade liberalization: on the prospects of self-enforcing cooperation
AbstractInternational economic order, including the rules of the game for trade, usually suffers from enforcement problems. We examine the prospects of self-enforcing cooperation as trade relationships evolve. It turns out that factor differentials and specificities are of utmost importance. In fact, prospects of self-enforcing cooperation are the lower the more diverse the countries are on that score. Differences may even result in countries showing an outright disinterest in trade liberalization. Notably, this result also holds in a recurrent, that is, in an evolutionary setting that otherwise induces cooperation in trade liberalization with self-enforcing properties. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
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