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Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

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  • Michael Wohlgemuth

    ()
    (Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany)

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    Abstract

    An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also - and even more so - characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Evolutionary Economics.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 273-295

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:10:y:2000:i:3:p:273-295

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    Related research

    Keywords: Schumpeter and public choice - Political entrepreneurs - Entry barriers - Policy reform - Political competition;

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    Cited by:
    1. Marianne Van Der Steen & John Groenewegen, 2009. "Policy entrepreneurship: empirical inquiry into policy agents and institutional structures," Journal of Innovation Economics, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 41-61.
    2. Michael Wohlgemuth, 2002. "Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 223-246, September.
    3. Douhan, Robin & Henrekson, Magnus, 2007. "The Political Economy of Entrepreneurship: An Introduction," Working Paper Series 688, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    4. Peter G. Klein & Joseph T. Mahoney & Anita McGahan & Christos N. Pitelis, 2010. "Toward a Theory of Public Entrepreneurship," DRUID Working Papers 10-07, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    5. Robin Douhan & Magnus Henrekson, 2010. "Entrepreneurship and second-best institutions: going beyond Baumol’s typology," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 629-643, August.
    6. Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2011. "The law of survival of the political class: an analysis of the Italian Parliament (1946-2010)," Working Papers 146, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
    7. Michael Wohlgemuth, 2011. "Is there a Paradox of a Hayekian Paternalist?," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2011-22, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.

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