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Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty

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  • Hyun Song Shin

    (Department of Economics, University of Southampton, Southampton, ENGLAND)

  • Andrew Postlewaite

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

  • Stephen Morris

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

Abstract

A number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge can be used to bound the effect of higher order uncertainty in certain problems. We further provide bounds on the size of bubbles in finite horizon rational expectations models where the bounds depend on the depth of knowledge.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 6 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 453-467

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:6:y:1995:i:3:p:453-467

Note: Received: March 23, 1994; revised version August 24, 1994
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Cited by:
  1. John Conlon, 2005. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles?," Game Theory and Information 0508007, EconWPA.
  2. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
  3. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000553, www.najecon.org.
  4. Rafiqul Bhuyan, 2002. "Information, Alternative Markets, and Security Price Processes: A Survey of Literature," Finance 0211002, EconWPA.
  5. Amil Dasgupta & Andrea Prat, 2005. "Reputation and Asset Prices: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000368, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  7. John R. Conlon, 2008. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles? Some Microeconomic Issues," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002330, David K. Levine.
  8. József Sákovics, 2001. "Games of Incomplete Information Without Common Knowledge Priors," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 347-366, June.
  9. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2001. "Persuasion Games with Higher Order Uncertainty," Working Papers of BETA 2001-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  10. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 03-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.

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