Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
AbstractA number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge can be used to bound the effect of higher order uncertainty in certain problems. We further provide bounds on the size of bubbles in finite horizon rational expectations models where the bounds depend on the depth of knowledge.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 6 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: March 23, 1994; revised version August 24, 1994
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew & Shin, Hyun Song, 1995. "Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 453-67, November.
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O47 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Measurement of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
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- Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008.
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- John Conlon, 2005. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles?," Game Theory and Information 0508007, EconWPA.
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