This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Hyun Song Shin (Department of Economics, University of Southampton, Southampton, ENGLAND)
Andrew Postlewaite (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)
Stephen Morris (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A number of recent papers have highlighted the importance of uncertainty about others' information in models of asymmetric information. We introduce a notion that reflects the depth of knowledge in an information system. We show how the depth of knowledge can be used to bound the effect of higher order uncertainty in certain problems. We further provide bounds on the size of bubbles in finite horizon rational expectations models where the bounds depend on the depth of knowledge.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 6 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 453-467
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:6:y:1995:i:3:p:453-467

Note: Received: March 23, 1994; revised version August 24, 1994
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Rosemarie Nagel & Antonio Cabrales & Roc Armenter, 2002. "Equilibrium Selection through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study," Economics Working Papers 601, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Rafiqul Bhuyan, 2002. "Information, Alternative Markets, and Security Price Processes: A Survey of Literature," Finance 0211002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. John Conlon, 2005. "Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles?," Game Theory and Information 0508007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Amil Dasgupta & Andrea Prat, 2005. "Reputation and Asset Prices: A Theory of Information Cascades and Systematic Mispricing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000368, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2001. "Persuasion Games with Higher Order Uncertainty," Working Papers of BETA 2001-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a Rationale," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 03-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors," ESE Discussion Papers 77, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1406, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.