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Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes

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  • Eddie Dekel

    (Northwestern University
    Tel Aviv University)

  • Ady Pauzner

    (Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

This paper considers a class of two-player symmetric games of incomplete information with strategic substitutes. First, we provide sufficient conditions under which there is either a unique equilibrium which is stable (in the sense of best-reply dynamics) and symmetric or a unique (up to permutations) asymmetric equilibrium that is stable (together with an unstable symmetric equilibrium). Thus, (i) there is always a unique stable equilibrium, (ii) it is either symmetric or asymmetric, and hence, (iii) a very simple local condition—stability of the symmetric equilibrium (i.e., the slope of the best-response function at the symmetric equilibrium)—identifies which case applies. Using this, we provide a very simple sufficient condition on primitives for when the unique stable equilibrium is asymmetric (and similarly for when it is symmetric). Finally, we show that the conditions guaranteeing the uniqueness described above also yield novel comparative statics results for this class of games.

Suggested Citation

  • Eddie Dekel & Ady Pauzner, 2018. "Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(3), pages 747-761, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:66:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1083-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1083-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2019. "On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Uniqueness of equilibrium; Stability; Symmetry breaking; Monotone comparative statics; Strategic substitutes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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