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Revealed preferences and aspirations in warm glow theory

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  • Vadim Cherepanov
  • Tim Feddersen
  • Alvaro Sandroni

Abstract

In warm glow models, an agent may prefer one alternative but aspire to choose another. The agent chooses her aspiration if she gets a sufficiently large warm glow payoff for acting as she aspires. This basic framework is widely used in models of turnout in elections and contributions to public goods, but is often criticized for being ad hoc. In this paper, we provide choice-theoretic foundations for warm glow theory. We characterize the empirical content of warm glow theory, show how to infer the core elements of the model from data and show that it is possible to predict behavior even when preferences and aspirations are not revealed. Our results provide support for assumptions often made in the literature and suggest new applications for warm glow models. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Vadim Cherepanov & Tim Feddersen & Alvaro Sandroni, 2013. "Revealed preferences and aspirations in warm glow theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 501-535, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:3:p:501-535
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0733-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abhinash Borah, 2019. "Voting Expressively," Working Papers 1012, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    2. Alfred Galichon & John Quah, 2013. "Symposium on revealed preference analysis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 419-423, November.
    3. Hans Keiding & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Revealed smooth nontransitive preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 463-484, November.
    4. Carpenter, Jeffrey, 2021. "The shape of warm glow: Field experimental evidence from a fundraiser," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 555-574.
    5. Tetsuya Tsurumi & Rintaro Yamaguchi & Kazuki Kagohashi & Shunsuke Managi, 2020. "Attachment to Material Goods and Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Life Satisfaction in Rural Areas in Vietnam," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(23), pages 1-20, November.
    6. Abhinash Borah, 2019. "Voting Expressively," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(3), pages 1617-1635, July.
    7. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2014. "Incumbency Advantage in Non-Democracies," NBER Working Papers 20519, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Sarah Ridout, 2020. "A Model of Justification," Papers 2003.06844, arXiv.org.
    9. Sintayoh Fissha Geberegziabher & Shahid Islam, 2022. "Voices of Tigray Women on the 2020 Election: The Freedom to Vote," International Journal of Regional Development, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(2), pages 1-14, December.
    10. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2018. "Dual random utility maximisation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 162-182.
    11. Silke Boenigk & Marcel Lee Mayr, 2016. "The Happiness of Giving: Evidence from the German Socioeconomic Panel That Happier People Are More Generous," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1825-1846, October.
    12. Guney, Begum & Richter, Michael & Tsur, Matan, 2018. "Aspiration-based choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 935-956.
    13. Georgios Gerasimou, 2016. "Partially dominant choice," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 127-145, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Warm glow; Revealed preferences; Aspirations; Choice; D01; D63; D71; D74;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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