Information gatekeepers: theory and experimental evidence
AbstractWe consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a decision maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the equilibrium of the game. We show that as the cost of information acquisition for one adversary increases, that person collects less evidence whereas the other adversary collects more evidence. We then test the results in a controlled laboratory setting. The behavior of subjects is close to the theoretical predictions. Mistakes are relatively infrequent (15%). They occur in both directions, with a higher rate of over-sampling (39%) than under-sampling (8%). The main difference with the theory is the smooth decline in sampling around the theoretical equilibrium. Comparative statics are also consistent with the theory, with adversaries sampling more when their own cost is low and when the other adversary’s cost is high. Finally, there is little evidence of learning over the 40 matches of the experiment. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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