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Fiscal Rules and Extrinsic Uncertainty

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  • Goenka, Aditya

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of two fiscal policy regimes on the set of equilibria. A general equilibrium model with public goods is used to re-examine Friedman's proposal for fiscal reform. The issue is whether a constraint upon fiscal policy requiring budget balance under all contingencies increases the stability of the economy. Stability is modelled in terms of neutralizing extrinsic uncertainty or sunspots. The government consists of bureaus providing public goods. The budgetary rules entail fixed shares of revenues and arrangements for budget balancing. Existence of equilibrium and properties of the equilibrium set are established. The Friedmanite rules permit extrinsic uncertainty to affect outcomes, while a policy that allows the bureaus greater discretion in the pursuit of their objectives neutralizes it.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 4 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 401-16

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:4:y:1994:i:3:p:401-16

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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Cited by:
  1. Marta Aloi & Hans Jorgen Jacobsen & Teresa Lloyd-Braga, 1998. "Endogenous Business Cycles and Stabilization Policies," Discussion Papers 00-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Mar 2000.
  2. Aditya Goenka, 2004. "Non-Fungibility and Mental Accounting: A Model of Bounded Rationality with Sunspot," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 234, Econometric Society.
  3. Melisso Boschi & Aditya Goenka, 2007. "Relative Risk Aversion And The Transmission Of Financial Crises," CAMA Working Papers 2007-28, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  4. Ghiglino, Christian & Shell, Karl, 2000. "The Economic Effects of Restrictions on Government Budget Deficits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 106-137, September.
  5. Melisso Boschi & Aditya Goenka, 2007. "Relative Risk Aversion And The Transmission Of Financial Crises," CAMA Working Papers 2007-28, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  6. Keister, Todd, 1998. "Money Taxes and Efficiency When Sunspots Matter," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 43-68, November.
  7. Goenka, Aditya & Prechac, Christophe, 2006. "Stabilizing sunspots," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(4-5), pages 544-555, August.
  8. Jang-Ting Guo & Kevin Lansing, 1999. "Fiscal policy, increasing returns, and endogenous fluctuations," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 99-08, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  9. Huberto Ennis & Todd Keister, 2001. "Optimal policy with probabilistic equilibrium selection," Working Paper 01-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  10. Aditya Goenka & Stefano Matta, 2008. "Manipulation of endowments and sunspot equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 267-282, August.
  11. Erkki Koskela & Mikko Puhakka, 2003. "Stabilizing Competitive Cycles with Distortionary Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 947, CESifo Group Munich.

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