General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions
AbstractWe consider a pure exchange economy, where for each good several trading institutions are available, only one of which is market-clearing. The other feasible trading institutions lead to rationing. To learn on which trading institutions to coordinate, traders follow behavioural rules of thumb that are based on the past performances of the trading institutions. Given the choice of institutions, market outcomes are determined by an equilibrium concept that allows for rationing. We find that full coordination on the market-clearing institutions without any rationing is a stochastically stable outcome, independently of the characteristics of the alternative available institutions. We also find, though, that coordination on other, non-market-clearing institutions with rationing can be stochastically stable.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 44 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2010. "General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/149592, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2006. "General Equilibrium and the Emergence of (Non) Market Clearing Trading Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5795, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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