Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry
AbstractWe introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Martin Shubik & David Eric Smith, 2004. "Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm378, Yale School of Management.
- Martin Shubik & Eric Smith, 2003. "Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1419, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
- Amir, Rabah & Sahi, Siddharta & Shubik, Martin & Yao, Shuntian, 1990.
"A strategic market game with complete markets,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 126-143, June.
- Sorin, S., 1994.
"Strategic Market Games with Exchange Rates,"
9411, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Martin Shubik, 2000.
"The Theory of Money,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1253, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009. "Default Penalty as a Disciplinary and Selection Mechanism in Presence of Multiple Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1730, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.