Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
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- Theo S. H. Driessen, 1998. "A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 301-303.
- Leonard, Herman B, 1983. "Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 461-79, June.
- Bettina Klaus & Frédéric Payot, 2013. "Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 13.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
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