Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
AbstractWe point out several conceptual difficulties of the rational expectations equilibrium concept. In particular we show that such an equilibrium need not be incentive compatible and need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium . A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with the private core is also provided. We conclude that the private core is a more appropriate concept to capture the idea of contracts under asymmetric information. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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