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K-price auctions: Revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design

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  • Dov Monderer
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Abstract

This paper discusses revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and a model of competition in auction design in symmetric equilibrium of k-price auctions, $k\ge 1$ , all in the setup of symmetric independent-private-value auctions. Our recommendation to organizers of auctions is to conduct k-price auctions, $k\ge 3$ in environments in which buyers are risk-seeking. The recommendation is given both for, a setup in which each organizer is a monopolist, and for one of oligopolistic competition. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Dov Monderer & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2004. "K-price auctions: Revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 255-270, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:255-270
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0424-x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Joyce Delnoij & Kris Jaegher, 2020. "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 183-216, February.
    2. Bernard Lebrun, 2015. "Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 245-275, June.
    3. J.M.J. Delnoij & K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2016. "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Working Papers 16-07, Utrecht School of Economics.
    4. Rapoport, Amnon & Otsubo, Hironori & Kim, Bora & Stein, William E., 2007. "Unique bid auctions: Equilibrium solutions and experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 4185, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Jul 2007.
    5. Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2008. "Competing auctions with endogenous quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 1-27, July.
    6. Doron Sonsino & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, 2006. "Experimental internet auctions with random information retrieval," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(4), pages 323-341, December.
    7. Mathews, Timothy & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2017. "A note on k-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 6-8.
    8. Ashlagi, Itai & Monderer, Dov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2009. "Mediators in position auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 2-21, September.
    9. Itai Ashlagi & Dov Monderer & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2011. "Simultaneous Ad Auctions," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(1), pages 1-13, February.
    10. Azrieli Yaron & Levin Dan, 2012. "Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, May.
    11. Wei Lim & Joo Lee-Partridge & Soo Tan, 2008. "Revenue implication of auction value in k-price sealed-bid auctions: An experimental study," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 25-38, March.
    12. Andreea Enache & Jean-Pierre Florens, 2020. "Identification and Estimation in a Third-Price Auction Model," Post-Print hal-02929530, HAL.
    13. Enache, Andreea & Florens, Jean-Pierre, 2019. "Identification and Estimation in a Third-Price Auction Model," TSE Working Papers 19-989, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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