In an incomplete information, common values setting with risk-neutral agents, we consider mechanisms for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership where the mechanism designer has no information about the distribution of signals of the agents. We find that the divide and choose mechanism systematically favors the chooser and hence fails on the grounds of fairness. We also examine the fairness properties of the winning and losing bid auctions and show that they systematically favor winning (resp. losing) bidder in ex post allocation of surplus. Finally, we show that a binding arbitration mechanism implements fair allocations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.