Innovative leadership: First-mover advantages in new product adoption
AbstractThis paper analyzes innovation adoption when uncertainty about its profitability cannot be resolved immediately. Firms begin with a common estimate of the probability of high demand. If any adopts, all observe realized demand. An increase in the initial estimate can decrease the equilibrium number of initial adopters, because it results in higher updated estimates that can induce future adoption by additional firms that reduces the initial adoption payoff. Moreover, innovative leadership does not imply initial adoption because leadership implies a greater waiting payoff as well as a greater adoption payoff. Leadership does, however, still provide a higher expected payoff. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 21 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
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- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- Cla - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- Num - Economic History - - - - -
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
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