Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers
AbstractWe present a game in which n persons split a cake, where a distinction between conditional and unconditional offers is made. This distinction sheds light on the contrasting results obtained in the previous literature of multilateral bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 20 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: March 13, 2001
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003.
"Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution,"
Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
0306, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007.
"Sequential Share Bargaining,"
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- Li, Duozhe, 2010. "A multilateral telephone bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 43-45, July.
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