A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of Fiat money
AbstractA model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Martin Shubik & D.P. Tsomocos, 1993. "A Strategic Market Game with Seigniorage Costs of Fiat Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1043, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- M. Shubik & D. Tsomocos, 1992. "A strategic market game with a mutual bank with fractional reserves and redemption in gold," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 123-150, June.
- Shubik, Martin & Yao, Shuntian, 1990. "The transactions cost of money (a strategic market game analysis)," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 99-114, October.
- Martin Shubik & D.P. Tsomocos, 1990. "A Strategic Market Game with a Mutual Bank with Fractional Reserves and Redemption in Gold (A Continuum of Traders)," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 964, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dmitry Levando, 2012. "A Survey Of Strategic Market Games," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, vol. 57(194), pages 63-106, July - Se.
- Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2006.
"Generic Determinacy and Money Non-Neutrality of International Monetary Equilibria,"
OFRC Working Papers Series
2006fe07, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
- Tsomocos, Dimitrios P., 2008. "Generic determinacy and money non-neutrality of international monetary equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 866-887, July.
- Dimitrios P Tsomocos, 2006. "Generic Determinacy and Money Non-Neutrality of International Monetary Equilibria," Economics Series Working Papers 2006-FE-07, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- F H Capie & Dimitrios P Tsomocos & Geoffrey E Wood, 2003. "E-barter versus fiat money: will central banks survive?," Bank of England working papers 197, Bank of England.
- Martin Shubik, 2007.
"The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach,"
The IUP Journal of Monetary Economics,
IUP Publications, vol. 0(2), pages 6-26, May.
- Martin Shubik, 2006. "The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000299, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Martin Shubik, 2006. "The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: A Summary of a Game Theoretic Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1572, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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