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research articles : How strategy sensitive are contributions?

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Author Info
Gary E. Bolton () (Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA)
Jordi Brandts () (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica , Campus UAB, E-08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, SPAIN)
Elena Katok () (Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA)

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Abstract

We test six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games, a category that includes the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. Our experiment focuses specifically on the strategic interdependence of contributing behavior, and manipulates the strategy space of a two-person dilemma game especially designed for the task. The hypothesis that contributors have non-linear preferences over own and the other player's payoffs accurately matches the strategic pattern of contributing that we observe across treatments. None of the reasons for contributing advanced by the other hypotheses, whether alone or in additive combination, does so.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 15 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 367-387
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:2:p:367-387

Note: Received: March 31, 1999; revised version: May 21, 1999
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Related research
Keywords: Experimental economics; Motivations; Dilemma games.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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