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How strategy sensitive are contributions?

Author

Listed:
  • Gary E. Bolton

    (Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA)

  • Jordi Brandts

    (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica , Campus UAB, E-08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, SPAIN)

  • Elena Katok

    (Department of Management Science and Information Systems, 310 Beam, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA)

Abstract

We test six hypotheses for contributions in dilemma games, a category that includes the prisoner's dilemma and public goods games. Our experiment focuses specifically on the strategic interdependence of contributing behavior, and manipulates the strategy space of a two-person dilemma game especially designed for the task. The hypothesis that contributors have non-linear preferences over own and the other player's payoffs accurately matches the strategic pattern of contributing that we observe across treatments. None of the reasons for contributing advanced by the other hypotheses, whether alone or in additive combination, does so.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary E. Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Elena Katok, 2000. "How strategy sensitive are contributions?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(2), pages 367-387.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:2:p:367-387
    Note: Received: March 31, 1999; revised version: May 21, 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Brandts, J. & Saijo, T. & Schram, A., 2000. "A Four Country Comparision of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms," ISER Discussion Paper 0496, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    2. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
    3. Gary Charness, 2004. "Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 665-688, July.
    4. Charness, Gary & Haruvy, Ernan & Sonsino, Doron, 2007. "Social distance and reciprocity: An Internet experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 88-103, May.
    5. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2005. "Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 151-169, November.
    6. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    7. Gerald Eisenkopf & Ruslan Gurtoviy & Verena Utikal, 2017. "Punishment Motives for Small and Big Lies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 484-498, June.
    8. Gary E. Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels & Rami Zwick, "undated". "Testing Theories of Other-regarding Behavior," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-43, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    9. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    10. Caleb Cox & Matthew Jones & Kevin Pflum & Paul Healy, 2015. "Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 441-484, April.
    11. Charness, Gary & haruvy, Ernan & Sonsino, Doron, 2001. "Social Distance and Reciprocity: The Internet vs. the Laboratory," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt46r1282v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    12. Brandts, Jordi & Schram, Arthur, 2001. "Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 399-427, February.
    13. Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September.
    14. Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Axel Ockenfels, 2003. "The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 217-241, May.
    15. Jordi Brandts & Enrique Fatás, 2004. "Endogenous social influence in an experimental dilemma game," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces 2004/59, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    16. Jordi Brandts & Enrique Fatas & Ernan Haruvy & Francisco Lagos, 2015. "The impact of relative position and returns on sacrifice and reciprocity: an experimental study using individual decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(3), pages 489-511, October.
    17. Charness, Gary B & Brandts, Jordi, 2002. "Instituto de Análisis Económico," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt2rf5p3rs, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    18. Buchan, Nancy R. & Johnson, Eric J. & Croson, Rachel T.A., 2006. "Let's get personal: An international examination of the influence of communication, culture and social distance on other regarding preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 373-398, July.
    19. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2003. "Truth or Consequences: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(1), pages 116-130, January.
    20. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charnes, "undated". "Retribution In A Cheap-Talk Experiment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 454.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    21. Tobias Hahn & Noël Albert, 2017. "Strong Reciprocity in Consumer Boycotts," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 509-524, October.
    22. Charness, Gary & Levine, David I., 2003. "The Road to Hell: An Experimental Study of Intentions," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4xs9d0nz, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experimental economics; Motivations; Dilemma games.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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