Exchange and optimality
AbstractA feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: September 9, 1996; revised version: February 11, 1998
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- GHOSAL, Sayantan & POLEMARCHAKIS, Heracles M., . "Exchange and optimality," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1389, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GHOSAL, Sayantan & POLEMARCHAKIS , Heracles, 1994. "Exchange and Optimality," CORE Discussion Papers 1994072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- S. Ghosal & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1996. "Exchange and Optimality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1133, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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