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Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms

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Author Info

  • Georgia Kosmopoulou

    () (Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma, 729 Elm Avenue, Norman, OK 73019-2103, USA)

Abstract

An efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules by pointing to a class of Groves mechanisms. It eliminates the strict requirement of common knowledge of priors and can be applied to many problems of incomplete information.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 229-237

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:1:p:229-237

Note: Received: October 22 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Allocative efficiency · Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms · Dominant strategy implementation · Payoff equivalence.;

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Cited by:
  1. Stefano Galavotti, 2008. "On Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Ex-Post Individually Rational Traders," Working Papers 161, Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
  2. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.

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