Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms
AbstractAn efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules by pointing to a class of Groves mechanisms. It eliminates the strict requirement of common knowledge of priors and can be applied to many problems of incomplete information.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: October 22 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997
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