AbstractThe main requirements for equivalence of the core of an economy and the Walrasian equilibrium allocations are largeness and the freedom to form almost arbitrary coalitions in the Edgeworthian barter processes. We investigate whether constraints on coalition formation and coalitional barter alter these insights. Our notion of the semi-core imposes a restriction on the collection of formable coalitions that does not affect the fundamental equivalence property. Using our concept of the contract-core we show that additional constraints on coalitional barter can only be alleviated within an environment with sufficiently many formable coalitions: besides a contract-core equivalence theorem we show certain non-equivalence results.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: December 11, 1995; revised version: September 17, 1996
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
- D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Value Theory
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.