The demand for illegal migration and market outcomes
AbstractThis article summarizes important aspects of illegal immigration. We analyse incentives of illegal immigrants as well as those of their employers by applying basic principles of labour economics, and by customising the workhorse of the economic theory of crime to suit the labour market for illegals immigrants. In addition, we describe the economic and social consequences of possible market outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Intereconomics.
Volume (Year): 39 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=113472
Other versions of this item:
- Entorf, Horst & Möbert, Jochen, 2004. "The Demand for Illegal Migration and Market Outcomes," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 37283, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
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