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A characterization of stochastic dominance efficiency

Author

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  • Haris Aziz

    (NICTA and UNSW)

Abstract

Pareto optimality is one of the most central concepts in economics. $$\mathrm {SD}$$ SD -efficiency (efficiency with respect to stochastic dominance) is the most established generalization of Pareto optimality for randomized settings. In the last decade, a number of characterizations of $$\mathrm {SD}$$ SD -efficiency have been presented especially in the domain of assignments. We present a new characterization of $$\mathrm {SD}$$ SD -efficiency in the more general domain of randomized social choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Haris Aziz, 2014. "A characterization of stochastic dominance efficiency," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 205-212, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:2:y:2014:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0047-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0047-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2003. "Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 157-172, September.
    2. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-681, April.
    3. Mihai Manea, 2008. "Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 489-496, March.
    4. Athanassoglou, Stergios, 2011. "Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 180-185, March.
    5. Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
    6. Stergios Athanassoglou, 2011. "Efficient Random Assignment under a Combination of Ordinal and Cardinal Information on Preferences," Working Papers 2011.11, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
    8. McLennan, Andrew, 2002. "Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 435-449, August.
    9. Carroll, Gabriel, 2010. "An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2463-2470, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Haris Aziz, 2017. "Characterizing SW-Efficiency in the Social Choice Domain," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 48-51.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Efficiency; Stochastic dominance; Social choice theory; Assignment problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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