Work incentives and other effects of the transition to social assistance in the transition economies: Evidence from Bulgaria
AbstractThe compensation levels, duration structure and means-tested aspects of the income support system for the unemployed in Bulgaria are considered. The available evidence points to the emergence of long term unemployment as a major problem, to a system of social assistance (SA) which is not overly generous and to growing poverty. Nevertheless, econometric analysis using micro data indicates that disincentives for job search exist for SA recipients. In the context of an acute fiscal crisis, systemic efficiency might be improved by restricting access to some benefits, by some changes in scaling, in moves towards targeted contributions and in improvements in administrative capacity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Empirical Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1/2 ()
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