Progressive ambition, electoral selection, and the creation of ideologues
AbstractThe process by which high-level office-holders are selected is shown to result in pure office-seeking politicians looking like ideologues. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.
Volume (Year): 1 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2000. "Progressive Ambition Electoral Selection and the Creation of Ideologues," Economics Working Paper Archive 419, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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- Jose A. Garcia-Martinez, 2010. "The Role of Selectivity in Hierarchical Social Systems," Working Papers 2010-05, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
- Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
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