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Large shareholders and corporate governance

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  • Pascal Frantz

    ()

  • Norvald Instefjord

    ()

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-009-0061-3
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 297-321

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:10:y:2009:i:4:p:297-321

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    Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm

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    Related research

    Keywords: Benefit diversions; Board independence; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Shareholder conflicts; G30; G32; G38;

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    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2202, October.
    2. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    3. Fahlenbrach, R端diger & Stulz, Ren辿 M., 2008. "Managerial ownership dynamics and firm value," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Harvey, Keith D & Shrieves, Ronald E, 2001. "Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance Choices," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 24(4), pages 495-512, Winter.
    5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, 2002. "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy," NBER Working Papers 8974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Paul A. Gompers & Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2002. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-32, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    7. Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Downes, David H & Heinkel, Robert, 1982. " Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 1-10, March.
    9. Ronald W. Masulis & Cong Wang & Fei Xie, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1851-1889, 08.
    10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    11. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 473-94, July.
    12. Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, 02.
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