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Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games

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  • Mitri Kitti

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    Abstract

    This paper introduces conditional Markov strategies in discrete-time discounted dynamic games with perfect monitoring. These are strategies in which players follow Markov policies after all histories. Policies induced by conditional Markov equilibria can be supported with the threat of reverting to the policy that yields the smallest expected equilibrium payoff for the deviator. This leads to a set-valued fixed-point characterization of equilibrium payoff functions. The result can be used for the computation of equilibria and for showing the existence in behavior strategies. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00186-013-0433-x
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Mathematical Methods of Operations Research.

    Volume (Year): 78 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 1 (August)
    Pages: 77-100

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:compst:v:78:y:2013:i:1:p:77-100

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    Related research

    Keywords: Dynamic game; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Markov policy; Discounting; Perfect monitoring;

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    Cited by:
    1. Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 87, Aboa Centre for Economics.

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