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The value of a fallback option

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  • Sascha Füllbrunn
  • Stefan Kreiner
  • Stefan Palan

Abstract

Fallback options are relatively common in the business context. If for example a firm fails to acquire a certain target firm—a first-best solution—it may decide to attempt the acquisition of another takeover target—a second best solution. When a decision maker tries to obtain the first-best solution, she may frequently choose different levels of effort to invest into its pursuit. This level of effort is generally influenced by the availability of a fallback option in case she fails to succeed in obtaining her first-best solution. Using a second price auction mechanism, we experimentally test whether subjects react to the existence and attractiveness of this fallback option by changing their bidding behavior. Our results show that subjects only partially adjust to the existence of the fallback option according to the theoretical prediction. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Sascha Füllbrunn & Stefan Kreiner & Stefan Palan, 2015. "The value of a fallback option," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 375-388, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:23:y:2015:i:2:p:375-388
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-015-0389-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ronald L. Oaxaca & David L. Dickinson, 2016. "Symmetric experimental designs: conditions for equivalence of panel data estimators," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(1), pages 85-95, May.
    2. Jürgen Fleiß & Stefan Palan, 2015. "Collaborative decision systems in economics and in complex societal and environmental applications," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 279-282, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fallback option; Second price auction; Bidding behavior; D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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