Price regulation in a spatial duopoly with possible non-buyers
AbstractIf the price is regulated in a spatial duopoly where consumers have a finite upper bound as to the price they are willing to pay for the differentiated product, in most cases the Principle of Minimum Differentiation does not apply. Depending on the market structure firms either (i) form local monopolies, or (ii) differentiate intermediately, or (iii) agglomerate at the market centre. Minimum differentiation is never total-surplus-maximizing nor desired by firms. In most cases the regulator sets a price below that maximizing industry profits. For a substantial range of market configurations the regulated (first-best) price exceeds marginal cost. This induces firms to serve a larger part of the market.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal The Annals of Regional Science.
Volume (Year): 36 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received: February 1999/Accepted: September 2001
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00168/index.htm
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sallstrom Matthews, S.E., 2007. "The Principle of Moderate Differentiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0720, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Brekke, Kurt R. & Nuscheler, Robert & Straume, Odd Rune, 2002.
"Quality and location choices under price regulation,"
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance
FS IV 02-28, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Kurt R. Brekke & Robert Nuscheler & Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Quality and Location Choices under Price Regulation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 207-227, 03.
- Brekke, Kurt R. & Nuscheler, Robert & Straume, Odd Rune, 2002. "Quality and location choices under price regulation," Working Papers in Economics 24/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Jeroen Hinloopen & Stephen Martin, 2013. "Costly Location in Hotelling Duopoly," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-101/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.