Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game
AbstractWe construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies. We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration in its journal European Transport / Trasporti Europei.
Volume (Year): (2005)
Issue (Month): 31 ()
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Road pricing; Political acceptability; Citizen-candidate;
Other versions of this item:
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
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