Regulation and Control of Hazardous Wastes
AbstractHazardous waste regulations require disposal in approved dumpsites, where environmental consequences are minimal but entry may be privately very costly. Imperfect policing of regulations makes the socially more costly option illicit disposal preferable form the perspective of the private decision maker. The existence of the waste disposal decision, its economic nature, production independence, and the control over environmental damage are key issues in the economics of hazardous waste management. This paper models a profit maximising, hazardous waste generating, monopolistic firm, a welfare maximizing regulatory agency, and investigates their behaviourial interactions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES) in its journal Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 130 (1994)
Issue (Month): I (March)
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