R&D Subsidies, Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets
AbstractWe examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 78 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Other versions of this item:
- Maria José Gil Moltó & Joanna Poyago.Theotoky & Vasileios Zikos, 2010. "R&D Subsidies, Spillovers and Privatization in Mixed Markets," Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Leicester 10/19, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
- Maria José Gil-Moltó & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & Vasileios Zikos, 2010. "R&D Subsidies, Spillovers and Privatization in Mixed Markets," CRIEFF Discussion Papers, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm 1008, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- O38 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
- Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1998. "R&D Competition in a Mixed Duopoly under Uncertainty and Easy Imitation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 415-428, September.
- Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2001. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-5.
- Saha, Souresh, 2014. "Firm's objective function and product and process R&D," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 484-494.
- Matsumura, Toshihiro & Okumura, Yasunori, 2013. "Privatization neutrality theorem revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 324-326.
- Matsumura, Toshihiro & Sunada, Takeaki, 2013. "Advertising competition in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 183-185.
- Kesavayuth, Dusanee & Zikos, Vasileios, 2013. "R&D versus output subsidies in mixed markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 293-296.
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