Putting Agency and Integrity to the Test
AbstractThis article examines recent claims about the necessity of integrity in agency relationships by putting agents with preferences that reflect integrity in an evolutionary competition with opportunistic agents. Corporate culture is modeled through a process of assortative matching between principal and agent types (via industry or group effects). This leads to a characterization of corporate governance where integrity is linked with value creation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 77 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
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- Arce, Daniel G., 2013. "Principals’ preferences for agents with social preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 154-163.
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