Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Duopoly Markets: Experimental Evidence with Complements and Substitutes
AbstractWe study the effect of demand structure on the ability of subjects to tacitly collude on prices by considering Bertrand substitutes and Bertrand complements. We find evidence of collusion in the complements treatment, but no such evidence is found in the substitutes treatment. This finding is somewhat in contrast with a previous study that observes tacit collusion in two treatments with similar underlying demand structures but with no market framing.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 76 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lisa Anderson & Beth Freeborn & Jason Hulbert, 2012.
"Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment,"
Review of Industrial Organization,
Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 37-50, February.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Beth A. Freeborn & Jason P. Hulbert, 2009. "Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment," Working Papers 84, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laura Razzolini).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.